Gimme Shelter: Reform of Real Estate Tax Shelters by Glasser, Farrell C.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 7
1974 
Gimme Shelter: Reform of Real Estate Tax Shelters 
Farrell C. Glasser 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Farrell C. Glasser, Gimme Shelter: Reform of Real Estate Tax Shelters, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 267 (1974). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol7/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
GIMME SHELTERt: REFORM OF
REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTERS
Farrell C. Glasser*
Today the majority of publicly traded securities are selling at prices
which are at or near an all time low. Interest in this country's equity mar-
kets has waned. The speculative wave of the mid-1960's seems a forlorn
recollection.' Despite the present morass of concern and confusion, one
area of public equity financing has emerged from the debacle: the "tax
shelter" investment.2
t © Abkco Music, Inc. 1969.
* Staff Attorney, Real Estate Tax Shelter Branch, Division of Corporation Finance,
Securities and Exchange Commission. Member of the New York and District of
Columbia Bars. B.A., 1966, American University; J.D., 1969, M.B.A., 1971, Syracuse
University; LL.M. (Taxation), 1974, George Washington University. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication by its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's
colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
I Some statistics may prove helpful in demonstrating the severity of the decline
in the stock market from 1967 to 1970:
[I]n May, 1970, a portfolio consisting of one share of every stock
listed on the Big Board was worth just about half of what it would
have been worth at the start of 1969. The high flyers that had led the
market of 1967 and 1968 . . . were precipitously down from their
peaks. Nor were they down 25 percent, like the Dow [Jones Industrial
Average], but 80, 90, or 95 percent. This was vintage 1929 stuff, and
the prospect of another great depression.
J. BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS 4 (1973).
2 Adam Smith, a noted Wall Street commentator, has defined tax shelters in this
way:
A tax shelter, for the general public, is a business somebody else is
in. Somebody who has a good lobby in Washington. Congress writes
the tax laws, and Congress in its wisdom and its collective desire
to be re-elected has decided that some areas of endeavor are socially
more noble than others, they are Good Things, and should be helped
along. So, if you are a dentist, you take your dentistry income, not a
Good Thing Congresswise, and put it into building an apartment house
or drilling an oil well, two Good Things relatively easy to understand,
and then you don't have to pay taxes this year. The income is offset by
the accounting charges from the Good Things. Some other year, when
the Good Thing is sold, you might have to pay a capital gains tax, but
that rate is lower than on earned income and maybe you can find an-
other shelter that year.
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1973, at 6.
The Treasury has stated that tax shelters are
[i]nvestment devices by which an individual obtains an immediate
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Favorable economic conditions during the past several years and con-
tinued high federal and state income taxes have prompted an ever-increas-
ing number of high-income taxpayers to invest in various tax shelter pro-
grams. This trend toward tax shelter investments has resulted in a pro-
lifieration of publicly and privately offered real estate, timber 3, cattle and
farming,4 oil and gas, 5 cable television, equipment leasing, 6 and various
other specialty programs. All of these programs have the specific objec-
tive of providing investors with the largest present paper tax loss possible,
while at the same time holding out to investors the promise of capital
gains tax treatment upon the ultimate disposition of the property.
High tax bracket investors who have been having a difficult time mak-
ing a profit in the stock market have turned to tax shelter investments.
They have been aided in their search for these investment opportunities
by a mounting volume of public syndications, featuring investments with a
minimum subscription of as low as $1000 to $1500. The National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers (NASD), which maintains records on most
public syndications, expects the dollar volume of syndication filings in
1973 to at least equal the peak $3.2 billion total filed in 1972. Represent-
ing some 539 separate programs, the 1972 total was double the $1.6 bil-
lion total of the previous year. If private offerings are included, an esti-
mated $10 billion was invested in tax shelter investments in 1973.-
Of the many different kinds of tax shelter investments that are available
to high bracket taxpayers, the most commonly encountered device is the
real estate tax shelter." This article describes the way a tax shelter oper-
ates, from both a business-economic and a tax viewpoint, and examines
the real estate tax shelter from the standpoint of possible tax reform to
correct the abuses that stem from real estate syndications.
and usually substantial reduction in the amount of tax on income he
already has and upon which he would but for obtaining the 'tax shelter'
have to pay tax. He thus in effect is investing the government's tax dol-
lars rather than his own money ....
The essence of a tax shelter is the deferral or postponement of tax
on current income, accomplished by accelerating future deductions
into the current taxable year.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE 95 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE].
3 See, e.g., Georges, Timber as a Tax Shelter: What are the Benefits and are There
Drawbacks?, 36 J. TAX. 364 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Durham, Farms and Farming: Gentlemen Farmers, New Hobby Loss
Rules; Holding Period; Etc., N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1527 (1971).
5 See, e.g., Romak, Natural Resources Including Oil and Gas: Timber; Who and
How, the Economics, the Risks and the 1969 Act, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
1589 (1971).
6 See, e.g., Goldstein, Equipment Leasing After the 1969 Act, N.Y.U. 29TH INST.
ON FED. TAX. 1589 (1971).
7 Federal Wrecking Crew: The I.R.S., Congress Zero in on Tax Shelters, Barron's,
Oct. 8, 1973, at 5.
8 The New York State Attorney General's office reports that $2.8 billion of public
participations in real estate were filed during the first six months of 1973, compared
to $1.9 billion for the same period in 1972 (about a three to two increase). THE
MONEY MANAGER, Aug. 27, 1973, at 48.
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I. THE OPERATION OF REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTERS
A. General Description
Real estate tax shelter programs utilize primarily apartment houses, of-
fice buildings, shopping centers, and other income-producing properties as
investment media. Included within these various groups of properties are
both new construction, where deductions, risk, and reward are greater,
and existing properties, where investment results may be more predict-
able. Since improved real estate enjoys the advantages of relative safety,
afforded by appreciation in value caused by population growth and infla-
tion, and high leverage, apartment houses account for the bulk of private
security offerings."
Real estate has some very distinct advantages as an investment me-
dium. It tends to appreciate in value to an extent at least equal to the rate
of inflation, 10 and, if the property is well selected, it often appreciates
considerably over a relatively short period of time. Further, by using debt
financing, an investor can purchase a valuable real estate asset with an
initial investment of only 10 percent of the total purchase price.11 This
financial leverage, of course, has the effect of magnifying both the income
and loss on a cash investment.' 2
In addition to the economic advantages of real estate investments, such
investments offer significant tax advantages to the investor. Because real
estate is an economic commodity and also a business property, it enjoys
several advantages under the tax law. Although some of these tax prin-
ciples apply to all property and all transactions, tax advantages have been
particularly responsible for real estate's favored investment position. Sev-
eral of the more significant of these tax advantages are: 1) allowance of a
deduction for depreciation of wasting business assets;', 2) application of
more favorable rules respecting recapture of depreciation on real prop-
9 Barron's, supra note 7, at 5.
10 The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that during the years 1963-73 the
GNP Deflator Index of all inflation rose 42 percent. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (Jan., 1974). During the same period the Price Index of
New One-Family Houses Sold rose 58.9 percent. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRICE INDEX OF NEW ONE-FAMILY HOUSES SOLD: FOURTH
QUARTER 1973 (1974).
11 Only 10 percent of the purchase price must be advanced if an investment is
made in low-income housing that comes under Section 236 of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z, 1715z-1 (1968).
12 Most investors in real estate assume or execute mortgages or deeds of trust
securing payment of long term promissory notes for amounts ranging up to 90 per-
cent of the acquisition price of the property. There is always the risk in these situa-
tions that the debt service obligation of a specific investment may be so great that the
revenues generated from the property will be insufficient to meet the obligation.
In the event of default in the payment of the obligation, the mortgagee may fore-
close, sell the property securing the obligation, and apply the proceeds of the sale
to the mortgage payment. If the proceeds are insufficient to meet the obligation,
it may be possible to hold the investor personally liable for the deficiency. On the
other hand, if the investment proves to be a profitable one, the investor can realize
a substantial return on his relatively minor equity investment.
13 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(1) (1964).
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erty;14 3) taxation of gain on the sale of investment property at capital
gains rates; 15 4) treatment of borrowed money as a transfer of capital,
rather than as receipt of taxable income; 16 5) nonrecognition of gain on
the exchange of property of like kind;17 6) allowance of a deduction for
the cost of leveraging;18 7) the right to elect to report the gain from the
sale of property by the installment method; 19 and 8) the step-up of the
tax basis of the assets of a deceased individual to their fair market value
on the date of the individual's death. 20
A simple example may prove helpful in conceptualizing the operation
of a real estate tax shelter investment program."' Lawyer X is an unmar-
ried taxpayer who in 1972 had earnings of $100,000, personal deductions
of $20,000, and a $39,390 potential tax liability. 22 Lawyer X invested
$30,000 in a real estate limited partnership syndicate comprised of twenty
investors in February, 1972. The syndicate invested in a 150-unit garden
apartment complex that cost the program $2,500,000; of this amount.
$375,000 was paid in cash, and the balance was represented by a non-
recourse mortgage. 23 The apartment project was completed in October.
1972, and for the rest of that year generated $15,000 of net cash flow.2 4
However, through various techniques, including the expensing of prepaid
interest, certain legal fees, and state and local taxes, the project was able
'to show a $400,000 loss for tax purposes. 25 Lawyer X's share of the
14 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1245, 1250.
15 Id. § 1221.
16 Id. §§ 63(a), 6 1(a).
17 Id. § 1031(a).
Is Id. § 163(a). Note, however, the limitation on deduction of interest on invest-
ment indebtedness set forth in Section 163(d).
19 Id. § 453(b).
20 Id. § 1014(a).
21 For the provisions relevant to the following discussion, see generally INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, Subch. K, §§ 701 et seq. The calculations in the text are based on the
1972 CCH Rapid Tax Calculator for Unmarried Individuals, 1973 U.S. Master Tax
Guide. For excellent examples of how a tax shelter works, see Panel Discussions
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 559-72
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussions]; Kanter, Real Estate Tax Shelters,
Everything You Wanted to Know but Did Not Know What to Ask, TAXES, Dec.,
1973, at 770.
22 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § I(c). For the purposes of this hypothetical, the
tax rate limitation on earned income has been disregarded. See INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 1348.
23 Nonrecourse mortgage loans are secured solely by a lien on the real estate.
Thus, no partner is personally liable on the note. See text accompanying note 60
infra.
24 The term cash flow is not synonymous with the term net earnings. Cash flow
represents the cash funds provided from operations (including lease payments from
builders and sellers on net leases), without deducting depreciation, but after deducting
the cash funds used to pay all other expenses, debt payments, and costs of capital
improvements and replacements. Rules for the Offer and Sale of Real Estate Pro-
grams of the Midwest Securities Commissioners Assoc. 3 (1973), on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Cash flow is significant to investors in
realty because it reflects only deductions for actual noncash expenditures, e.g., depre-
ciation. Therefore, cash flow reflects a more accurate picture of the financial position
of a real estate project.
25 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 62; Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1 (1965); Panel Discus-
sions, supra note 21, pt 4 at 524. But see Rev. Bul. 68-643, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
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cash flow was $750, his investment credit was $250, and his share of the
loss amounted to $20,000.26 For 1973, it is assumed here that Lawyer
X's share of the cash flow increased to $2,500, with his share of the year's
loss being $12,000.27 Lawyer X's $20,000 share of the project's loss for
1972, along with the investment credit, were available to offset his in-
come as an attorney ' and reduced his personal income tax liability to
$26,213 This tax shelter arrangement resulted in a net tax saving of
$3,177 to the taxpayer. In addition, the $750 cash flow was received as
a tax-free return of capital.30 Lawyer X's basis in the investment was de-
creased by $20,750, representing the loss allocation plus the cash flow
distribution.3 1
B. Use of the Limited Partnership
1. In General-The limited partnership form of enterprise organization
is virtually always used for tax shelter investment programs. The pro-
moter, or a corporation which the promoter has formed, is the sole gen-
eral partner, while the investors are the limited partners. The limited part-
nership format is selected because it meets the primary objectives of the
tax shelter: to allow a flow-through of losses and other tax incidents to
the individual investors; and to avoid imposition of tax at both the entity
level and the investor level.32 Neither the Subchapter C, : 1 nor the Sub-
26 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 38, 46, 702. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.46-1 (1972).
Lawyer X's cash flow and loss were determined by dividing the number of investors
in the program into the total net cash flow and total loss respectively for the pro-
gram in 1972.
27 The figures cited have been arbitrarily selected to illustrate the increase in the
cash flow in the second year of operation. This increase results from the receipt of
revenues over an entire year and a decrease in losses due to a decrease in the de-
preciation deduction and other expenses. While in this hypothetical the total deprecia-
tion deduction would increase (reflecting depreciation during 1973 as compared to
only three months in 1972), generally the depreciation deduction would decrease dur-
ing the second full year of operation.
28 See TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 702.
29 Lawyer X's total deductions for 1972 were increased by $20,250, giving him a
taxable income of $59,750.
30 Lawyer X receives this tax-free share of the cash flow because of the discrepancy
between the terms cash flow and net income. See note 24 supra. Although the pro-
gram had a net loss for tax purposes as a result of the expensing of prepaid items
and deductions for depreciation, for business purposes the program had a positive
cash flow.
31 See TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 705, 733.
32 TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, Subch. K, § 701. There may be other reasons for
choosing this form of enterprise. Generally, the nontax characteristics of a limited
partnership consist of the following: 1) A limited partner is not liable to the creditors
of the partnership in excess of his capital contribution, unless he takes part in the
active control and management of the partnership's business and affairs. Uniform
Limited Partnership Act §§ 1,7. 2) The general partner is responsible for the manage-
ment and control of the-business, except that certain voting privileges are vested in
the limited partners. Id. § 9. 3) A limited partner's interest in the limited partnership
is considered to be personal property, and its transfer may be restricted depending
upon the terms in the limited partnership agreement. Id. § 18. 4) Absent modification
by agreement, the death, retirement, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of the general part-
ner dissolves the limited partnership. Id. § 20(a). 5) The death of a limited partner
does not affect the existence of the limited partnership. Id. § 21.
33 TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 301 et seq.
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chapter S: 1 corporation, each of which is available as an alternative form
of organization, offers the tax shelter features available to the limited part-
nership. :5
2. Tax Considerations-There are several significant aspects of federal
taxation that relate to all limited partnerships and are important to inves-
tors interested in tax shelters: a limited partnership is not a taxpaying en-
tity, so the partners report their distributive share of partnership income
or loss individually; :'" a limited partner's distributive share of income or
loss is determined by the provisions of the Limited Partnership Agree-
ment; : 7 therefore, a large portion of the losses can be allocated to the
limited partners, so long as avoidance or evasion of tax is not the princi-
pal purpose of the allocation; : ' and limited partnership losses for the
current year are deductible to the extent of the adjusted basis of a part-
ner's interest in the partnership as of the end of the year."" It should be
noted that a limited partner's tax basis includes that individual's share of
partnership liabilities, including a liability to which the partnership prop-
erty is subject, so long as no partner is personally liable for the debt, i.e.,
nonrecourse loans. 4 0
In addition to the tax features of all limited partnerships, there are sev-
eral tax features that benefit a real estate limited partnership in particular.
In effect, these features are the guts of a tax shelter program from a tax
34 1d. § 1371 et seq.
:5The Subchapter C corporation pays income tax at the corporate level with no
pass-through of losses to investors. Id. § 11. In addition, its distributions are of after-
tax dollars which are then subject to an additional tax at the shareholder level. Id.
§ 301. The Subchapter S corporation is severely restricted in its utility as a tax shelter
because of limitations imposed on passive income and restrictions at the shareholder
level on the use of losses. Tax losses are limited to the extent of funds actually in-
vested by the shareholders in the Subchapter S corporation. Id. §§ 1372(e)(5), 1374.
36 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 701-02, 704.
:I7 Id. § 704(a).
381ld. § 704(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (1964); Rev. Rul. 68-139, 1968-1 CuM.
BULL. 311; Orrisch, 55 T.C. No. 395 (1970).
:3' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704(d).
40Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). See also note 23 supra, and text accompanying
notes 44-51 infra.
In order for a limited partnership to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes,
it must qualify as a partnership rather than an association. It must, therefore, have
more noncorporate characteristics than corporate characteristics. Treas. Reg. §
1.7701-2(a)(3) (1960). In determining whether an entity constitutes a limited partner-
ship or a corporation for federal income tax purposes, Treasury Regulation § 1.7701-
2(a)(1) calls for a review of six corporate characteristics: 1) the presence of asso-
ciates; 2) an objective to carry on a business and to divide the gains therefrom; 3)
continuity of life; 4) centralization of management; 5) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property; and 6) free transferability of interests. The first two
characteristics are always present in a business entity of at least two persons. There-
fore, the presence of a majority of the remaining characteristics is crucial to the
determination of the form of the taxable entity. For a detailed discussion of the
association problem, see Halperin & Tucker, Low Income Housing (FHA 236) Pro-
grams: One of the Few Tax Shelter Opportunities Left, 36 J. TAx. 2, 3-5 (1972). Where
the sole general partner of a limited partnership is a corporation, the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS), as a condition to issuing a tax ruling that the limited partnership
will not be taxed as a corporation, requires that certain net worth and investment
requirements be met by the corporate general partner. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-2
CUM. BULL. 42. See also Halperin & Tucker, supra at 5.
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standpoint, and they are the tax provisions that are most susceptible to
revision if reform is to be effective.4 1
a. Tax Deductions During Construction-Tax deductions are permitted
during construction of a real estate project. Deductions may include inter-
est paid on the building loan, fees for loan commitments (points), local
taxes, and certain other expenses, in addition to the capital outlays for
construction.4 2 These deductions create operating losses for the invest-
ment program, since revenues from the project have not yet begun. As a
result, an investor receives significant tax deductions which he can use
to offset his "other income. ' '4: These deductions, of course, are especially
helpful to investors in the high income tax brackets.
In contrast to this tax deduction treatment, which implies a loss of eq-
uity capital during construction, generally accepted accounting principles
prescribe capitalization of all monetary outlays during construction. Be-
cause rental real estate construction usually involves the use of substantial
leverage-up to 90 percent of the costs may be represented by mortgage
debt which has been borrowed on a nonrecourse basis-deductible ex-
penses may account for most or even all of the equity by the time the con-
struction has been completed. It has been stated that "for a high bracket
taxpayer this can, in some cases, mean tax savings of up to 75 percent of
his total investment. A 60 percent recovery during construction could be
regarded as typical. 44
b. Use of Depreciation-A taxpayer is permitted to depreciate the full
cost of the structure and improvements less salvage value after construc-
tion has been completed, 45 even though most of the cost has been finan-
ced, and the taxpayer has no personal liability on the mortgage debt. The
maximum allowable rate of depreciation varies, depending upon the type
of real estate project, but some form of accelerated depreciation generally
is available. 46
41 See Kanter, supra note 21, at 786-94; part III in! ra.
42 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, at 568.
43 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
44 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, at 524. Whether interest payments are de-
ductible in full in the year made, or whether the deduction must be allocated over
the taxable years involved, is governed by the principles of Revenue Ruling 68-643,
which states in part:
A deduction for interest paid in advance on each indebtedness for a
period not in excess of 12 months of the taxable year immediately
following the taxable year in which the prepayment is made will be con-
sidered on a case by case basis to determine whether a material distor-
tion of income has resulted . . . . If interest is prepaid for a period
extending more than 12 months beyond the end of the current taxable
year, the deduction . . . will be considered as materially distorting
income.
Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76. See also Rev. Rul. 60-582, 1969-2 CuM.
BULL. 29. On finding such a material distortion of income, the IRS would require
that the taxpayer allocate such prepayment over the taxable years involved.
45 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (1956).
46 Accelerated methods of depreciation increase the value of the tax shelter in two
ways. First, at any time before the end of the investment's useful life, the total de-
preciation deductions allowed under accelerated depreciation will be greater than
WINTER 19741
Journal of Law Reform
The allowance of the depreciation deduction is based on the premise
that when "a taxpayer is deriving income from a wasting economic assct,
an appropriate measure of his taxable net income on an annual basis is
obtained by prorating the cost of the asset over its life, as an offset against
the gross income from it. ' '4 7 Thus, even though the depreciation expense
does not represent a cash outlay by the investor, and despite the fact that
the property may in fact be appreciating in value, depreciation deductions
on buildings and other improvements can be taken in determining taxable
income for federal income tax purposes.
In addition to gaining the advantages of the depreciation deduction.
investors may receive cash distributions from the investment. Distribu-
tions may be available even though the project may show a net paper loss,
resulting from noncash expenses such as the depreciation deduction.4 8
The amount of the tax-free cash distribution is directly related to the ex-
cess of the depreciation deductions over the amount of the mortgage
amortization payments. Since amortization payments typically are smaller
in the earlier years of a project's life and increase in later years, use of
accelerated depreciation will result in significant tax-free cash distributions
in the early years of a project. These distributions represent a nontaxable
return of capital to the extent of the investor's basis.4 '
Thus, depending upon the rate of depreciation and other factors, the
ability to deduct depreciation may result in both a tax-free cash return to
the investor and a tax loss that will reduce any other taxable income that
the investor may have.*-" The depreciation deduction creates a "shelter"
for some or all of the cash flow from the project and may produce exce-s
deductions, which will then shelter income from other sources.
Because an investor can deduct losses only to the extent of his basis in
the partnership investment, how can he use losses generated by the in-
vestment to offset income from other sources that is in excess of his orig-
inal capital contribution to the partnership? In answering this question.
it is helpful to turn to the Supreme Court's decision in Crane v. Coln-
missioner.-1 The Crane case established two generally accepted and inter-
related principles 2 First, regardless of whether the owner of property
has any personal liability on a mortgage, the amount of the mortgage li-
those permitted under the straight-line method. Therefore, if the limited partnership
sells the property before the end of its useful life, accelerated depreciation will in-
crease the absolute size of the shelter to the limited partners. Second, because accel-
lerated depreciation allows larger deductions in the early years, the present value of
the tax dollars saved is increased.
47 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, at 512.
4 The depreciation deduction on investments in realty is the main reason that net
income and cash flow are not synonymous. See note 24 supra.
49 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 731, 733; Panel Discussions, supra note 21 at
556.
50 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
51 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
52 See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imag-
inary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Epstein, The Application
of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partnerships Form Without Substance, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 100 (1972).
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ability is included in the tax basis of the property that is acquired subject
to the mortgage.5 : Second, on the sale of the property, the amount real-
ized, for the purpose of calculating gain or loss on the sale, includes any
liabilities to which the property transferred is subject. 4
The Crane doctrine is of considerable importance when property sub-
ject to a mortgage is depreciable, because depreciation is calculated on the
tax basis of the property.,5 * The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides
that ordinarily the initial basis of property is its cost." '  The Crane case,
by permitting the taxpayer to include the amount of the mortgage in his
cost basis, allows a taxpayer to deduct depreciation charges in excess of
his original capital contribution.;7 In the early years of ownership, the
effect is magnified if the property is subject to accelerated depreciation.
The Crane doctrine is applied to real estate limited partnerships that
have received loans to finance acquisition of depreciable property. In
the typical real estate limited partnership, while each of the partners con-
tributes part of the cash necessary for the undertaking, the bulk of the
construction costs or purchase price is financed by a loan secured by a
lien on both the land and the building. Reflecting the influence of the
Crane decision, the Code treats the loan to the partnership as a contribu-
tion by one or another of the partners.,8 The statutory provision is am-
plified by a Treasury Regulation which states that where all of the partners
are personally liable for the partnership indebtedness, each partner is en-
titled to a pro rata increase in the basis of his partnership interest. 9 Sim-
ilarly, if the loan is secured by only a lien on the real estate, so that no
partner is personally liable on the note (i.e., a nonrecourse loan), each
partner is also entitled to increase the basis of his partnership interest by
a pro rata share of the indebtedness."'
The provision that allows a step-up in the basis of a partnership interest
to the extent of a pro rata share of nonrecourse loans enables each part-
ner to deduct losses in excess of his capital contribution, thereby shelter-
ing his income from other sources.
c. Conversion of the Depreciation Deduction into Capital Gain-The
Crane case established the principle that on the sale of investment prop-
erty, the amount realized includes any liabilities to which the property
transferred was subject."' Therefore, on the sale of the investment prop-
erty by a partnership, the partners will have to include their respective
53 331 U.S. at 11-12.54 Id. at 12-14.
55 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(g).
56Id. § 1012.
57 See, e.g., 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 21, acquiescing in Manuel Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340
(1966).
58 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 752(a).
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a) (1956).
60Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). If only some of the partners are personally
liable on the partnership's indebtedness, then only those who are personally liable
are considered to have made a contribution of money to the partnership that permits
a step-up in the bases of their interests. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 752(a), 722.
61 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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shares of the unpaid balance of the mortgage in the amount that they re-
ceive. Since the partners' adjusted basis, as reduced by depreciation de-
ductions, may well be exceeded by the unpaid balance of the mortgage, the
partners may be forced to recognize a gain in excess of the cash or property
received in consideration for the sale of the property. Even so, the part-
ners, in effect, have been able to convert ordinary income into capital
gain by offsetting the property's ordinary income with the deductions for
depreciation and other expenses. Furthermore, the partners have had the
opportunity to defer the tax on the income that was sheltered by the de-
ductions; thus they have received an interest-free loan from the govern-
ment, in the amount of the tax they would otherwise have had to pay. ' ':
d. Refinancing of Property Investments-In a situation where the value
of the investment property appreciates, the general partner, rather than
selling the property, may decide to refinance the project by obtaining a
new loan secured by the property's appreciated value. The effect of re-
financing is to give the partnership the difference between the new loan
and the original loan; this difference may be distributed to the partners
tax-free. Although this is the same result that sale of the property would
produce, refinancing is even better than sale of the property, for if the
property is sold, a tax on the profit would have to be paid. Further, refi-
nancing, creating a larger indebtedness, not only postpones taxation, but
also increases interest payments, which thereby generate increased tax
deductions. Even though a tax may be due upon the eventual disposition
of the property, the partnership will be able to receive tax-free use of the
loan proceeds, to po3tpone the payment of tax until the disposition of the
property (in effect obtaining an interest-free loan), and to increase the
capital gains tax advantage allowed under the Code by stretching out the
period of ownership and thereby reducing the effects of recapture.63
62 This general statement is limited by Section 1250 of the Code, which provides
that in some instances a portion of the gain from the sale or exchange of depreciable
real property may be treated as ordinary income, if the taxpayer has taken deprecia-
tion in excess of that allowed by the straight-line method. See text accompanying
note 115 infra. Section 1245, however, which applies to personal property, contains
a much more strict recapture rule that virtually eliminates the conversion of ordinary
income to capital gain through depreciation charges taken after 1962.
63 p. STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER 177 (1973). See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954,
§ 1250; notes 121-22 and accompanying text infra.
It is often stated that a tax incentive is really like a loan, since a significant per-
centage of the money must be returned in taxes when the property is sold; therefore,
it is felt that the incentive occurs only in the early years when depreciation deductions
are high. However, the loan is in fact extremely valuable (see text accompanying note
62 supra), and its value does not diminsh markedly despite the dramatic decline in
the size of the annual deduction. McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Com-
puterized Expose, 57 VA. L. REV. 521, 555 (1971).
An alternative to refinancing would be the use of a wraparound mortgage. The
wraparound mortgage is a second mortgage, subordinate in all cases to an existing
first mortgage, which remains outstanding and unsatisfied. It differs from the con-
ventional second mortgage in that the face amount is greater than the outstanding
first mortgage, and it incorporates a special agreement between the parties providing
for payment of the debt service on the first mortgage. The loan is otherwise evi-
denced and secured by the usual form of promissory note and second mortgage. The
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The essence of the real estate tax shelter, therefore, is a combination
of high leverage, accelerated depreciation, use of the limited partnership
entity, and the basic tax rules for treatment of nonrecourse mortgages.
If. TAX POLICY
A. The Real Estate Tax Shelter: Loophole or Incentive?
One commentator has noted that
[t]he real estate tax shelter is an outgrowth of the accelerated
depreciation deductions in 1954, and typifies the tax preference
or tax loophole created largely by accident. The focus of the
1954 liberalization was the proper allowable depreciation for
machinery and equipment, but there was little or no analysis of
the possible impact of the liberalized depreciation methods on
investment in real estate."
Thus, it has been claimed that the birth of the real estate tax shelter was
the result of the promiscuity of tax reformers, who were unaware of the
ramifications of their amendment of the Code's provision for depreciation
deductions.
Professor Boris Bittker of Yale has noted that "It] he term 'tax loophole'
is often used to denote a flaw in the language of the... Code or in the
Treasury Regulations, discovered by a sharp-eyed lawyer or accountant
face amount of the mortgage is the sum of the outstanding balance under the first
mortgage plus the amount of additional funds, if any, to be disbursed by the wrap-
around mortgagee, with an annual debt service computed on this face amount. The
interest rate is always higher than the interest rate on the first mortgage. This con-
tract rate inevitably is equal to, or slightly less than, the market rate for conventional
first mortgage loans. The wraparound mortgage's most distinctive feature, however,
is the agreement by the wraparound lender, upon receipt of the debt service on the
wraparound mortgage, to deduct the required debt service on the first mortgage and
remit it directly to the first mortgagee.
The wraparound mortgage is used when existing financing either cannot be readily
prepaid, because of an unfavorable prepayment provision, or where the interest rate
on the present first mortgage is so low as to make prepayment impractical. In addi-
tion, due to amortization of the first mortgage, increased property value, improve-
ments or additions, better leasing income, or a combination of the above, there may
be justification for refinancing with a larger mortgage. From a tax shelter stand-
point, two major considerations in using a wraparound mortgage are the additional
step-up in basis that investors will receive on the increased financing (see text ac-
companying notes 52-60 supra) and the ability to avoid the limitation on the deducti-
bility of prepaid interest (see note 44 supra). Prepaid interest on the wraparound
mortgage will be based on the entire amount of the mortgage and not just on the
difference between the senior first mortgage and the wraparound mortgage. See Nad,
Financing Techniques and Problems: Wrap-Around Mortgages, Unusable Interest
Deductions, and Interest Subsidy, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1107 (1971).
64 Ritter & Sunley, Jr., Real Estate and Tax Reform: An Analysis and Evaluation
of the Real Estate Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 30 MD. L. REV. 5, 8
(1970) (footnote omitted). See also Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Inple-
inenting Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures,
83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 711 n.3 (1970).
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and exploited by his clients."' -, However, if the loophole is, in effect, a
legislative error, once it comes to light it should be corrected by Congress.
Professor Bittker thus notes that "[w]hen discovered by a tax expert...
a loophole is a wasting asset that he must exploit quickly but warily.""';
If Professor Bittker's explanation is correct, it would appear that the real
estate tax shelter, although possibly once the result of a legislative error.
can no longer be deemed a loophole since it is now ubiquitously known
to tax attorneys, accountants, and their clients.0 57
If the real estate tax shelter is no longer a loophole, perhaps it should
be considered a tax incentive. Several factors point to this conclusion.
Since the appearance of the real estate tax shelter opportunity in 1954,
Congress and the Treasury Department have continually voiced their sup-
port for this tax preference, thereby creating an indirect government sub-
sidy to the housing industry.118 Although machinery and equipment in-
vestments were initially favored by the allowance of accelerated deprecia-
tion of these assets for tax accounting, "subsequent Congressional action
to limit the benefit of the depreciation through recapture has been more
restrictive with respect to personality than realty. '", In addition, the Con-
gress has continually approved tax legislation which has been favorable to
the development of low- and middle-income housing. 70
If it is assumed for the sake of argument that, in order to meet the
country's needs, real estate development, particularly of low- and middle-
income housing, should be encouraged through government-sponsored fi-
nancial assistance, it is then necessary to compare the tax incentive
method of encouraging development with financing by direct governmental
expenditures.
65 Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MIcH. L. REV.
1099, 1102 (1973).
66 Id. at 1103.
67 Professor Bittker goes on to say that
[lacking a more systematic study of this question, I offer the hypothesis
that loopholes . .. are comparatively rare. The quality of legislative
drafting in the federal tax field is unusually high, the Internal Revenue
Code is subject to frequent revision, and I know of no area of the law
in which the courts are more likely to search for the legislative purpose
and prefer it, whenever it can be discerned, to a literal construction of
the statutory language.
Id. at 1107.
68 See Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 6, at 792 n.66:
The legislative history of sections 167 and 1250 of the Code illustrate
the continued Congressional intent to base Federal aid to the housing
industry upon an indirect subsidy through the Internal Revenue Code
as well as a direct subsidy through the National Housing Act.
69 Id. In 1962, Section 1245 was adopted. This section converted the gain on the
sale of depreciable personal property from capital gain to ordinary income to the
extent of all post-1961 depreciation deductions. In 1964, Section 1250 was enacted.
It provided that gain on the sale of depreciable real property within ten years of
acquisition was to be taxed as ordinary income to the extent of a declining percentage
of the excess of post-1963 depreciation over straight-line depreciation. In 1969, Con-
gress reduced the tax advantage of real estate investment, by reducing the methods of
depreciation available with respect to real property and by broadening the reach of
the recapture rules. See part III B infra.
70 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 6, at 793 n.69-70.
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B. Use of Tax Incentives to Achieve Societal Goals
1. The Objectives of Tax Reform-It has been suggested that "the
prime objective of tax reform is to achieve greater fairness in the federal
tax system." 1 Many tax experts feel that tax shelter investments severely
diminish public confidence in the tax system, by creating the belief that
there are privileged groups who can escape the obligation of paying taxes,
while the average person is forced to pay his tax bills. Viewed in this
light, it is felt that an income tax system remains fair only if it reaches
all income and "only if there are no preferences or loopholes through
which some people and corporations can escape. -72
Professor Stanley S. Surrey of Harvard is a strong advocate of tax re-
form, especially with regard to tax shelters. Testifying before the House
Ways and Means Committee, he stated:
Most persons pay their income tax weekly or monthly through
withholding, and thus can be led to think the system works me-
thodically and inexorably for everyone else. The wealthy inves-
tor knows differently, because his investment advisors guide him
to 'tax shelters' through which he can become still wealthier.
The high-income individual can join partnership syndicates in
real estate ... activities that produce large 'tax losses.' But these
are 'losses' only in the eye of the tax law. In the real world and
in the investors' own accounts they are his outlays on which he
intends eventually to make money from the investment. In the
meantime, on his tax return these 'tax losses' can be used to off-
set income from other sources-his professional income, div-
idends, salary-thereby making much of that other income non-
taxable. There is something terribly amiss when to provide low-
income housing for shelter of the poor, we at the same time
shelter tax millionaires. As a result of these tax shelter and other
tax escapes, persons with actual incomes in the hundreds of
thousands, even millions, either pay no income tax or pay at a
rate less than that of skilled or even semi-skilled workers. These
situations are an offense to our sense of fairness and decency.
This is why tax reform is really a moral issue. It is not just a
technical exercise to be engaged in by skilled experts. It is an
effort to restore fundamental morality to a tax system by ending
both its unfairness and the cynical, immoral way the tax game
is played today by those with money and knowledgeable advi-
sors.
73
Besides the inequities suggested by Professor Surrey, another reason for
tax reform is to foster efficiency and economy in the indirect expenditure
of government funds. Professor Surrey believes that tax incentives re-
ceived by industries such as real estate are, in effect, a
government expenditure program carried out through a special
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provision in the tax system. The special tax provision is a
method of providing financial assistance from the Government
to the activities and persons who fit within the provision. These
special tax provisions really have nothing to do with the essen-
tials of an income tax .. . instead [they] . ..are methods of
spending Government funds.74
Given that there are various methods of achieving a certain societal
goal, it is important to evaluate the tax incentive method that is currently
in use.
2. The Pitfalls of Tax Incentives-There are at least three reasons for
using tax incentives to accomplish socially desirable aims: 1) tax incentives
are often the most expeditious manner of accomplishing a desired result;
2) tax incentives achieve the result at a lower cost to the Treasury than
that of a non-tax incentive program (e.g., a direct grant); and 3) tax incen-
tives benefit society by involving thousands of individuals in making ex-
penditure decisions, rather than merely concentrating additional resource-
allocation power in the hands of government bureaucrats. 7 ,
A proper consideration for tax reform is whether indirect government
expenditures are preferable to direct expenditures. Recently compiled sta-
tistics show that the tax incentive system is being abused. For example.
the growth of losses in major tax shelter industries has been astonishing.
From 1965 to 1971, the aggregate net losses sustained by all partnerships
reporting real estate losses increased by 330 percent. The increase in
losses for all the major tax shelter industries combined was 372 percent.
In 1965, partnerships in these industries reported $900 million of net
losses and $1.4 billion of net profits. By 1971, however, the figures had
dramatically reversed, so that losses amounted to $4.2 billion, while pro-
fits totaled $2.4 billion.76
The demand for tax deductions is also soaring. It has been said that
the market for deductions is "[n] o longer the domain of a limited number
of financial sophisticates, [rather,] the market for deductions has become
a mass market. ' 77 All the available evidence points to the conclusion that
this trend will continue. The National Association of Securities Dealers
reported an increase of 61 percent in the number of registered filings of
tax shelter programs and a 106 percent increase in the dollar volume of
such filings between 1971 and 1972. In a two-year period, 1970-72, pub-
licly offered tax shelter filings increased from 145 to 539, with a more
than three-fold increase in dollar volume occurring during the same pe-
riod.78
74 Id. at 13.
75 For a discussion of the reasons that the benefits of tax incentives are illusory,
see Surrey, supra note 64, at 715-19.
76 Remarks of Mr. John H. Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy, before the California Certified Public Accountants Foundation, in Los
Angeles, California, Sept. 20, 1973, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Remarks], on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
77 Id. at 4.
78 Id.
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The abuse of the tax system, which is documented by these figures, can
be traced to a number of substantial defects in the present tax incentive
program." Tax incentives inefficiently distribute tax benefits because
their impact cannot be directed solely toward the activities that Congress
deems deserving of favorable tax treatment. In most instances, the tax
incentive can be used by others who are not directly involved in the activ-
ity that Congress wants to encourage. For example, with respect to real
estate, the tax incentives, in the form of depreciation and other deduc-
tions, encourage the building of apartment houses for upper income ten-
ants, shopping centers, office buildings, and other luxury structures, as
well as low- and middle-income housing. The economic motivation to de-
velop real estate exists because all builders can receive the benefit of tax
incentives, even though the primary intention of Congress in permitting
these incentives was to encourage only the development of low- and
middle-income housing.8 1s One commentator states that "[wihen Congress
offered this tax incentive to all residential rental buildings, it laid compul-
sory claim on [the taxpayers'] dollars to help finance 'tax shelter' projects
for the rich as well as the poor."8'
Even more significant, however, is the evidence that real estate tax in-
centives have not fulfilled the purpose for which they were designed, i.e.,
they have not appreciably increased the size of the nation's stock of low-
and middle-income housing. Studies reveal that the primary long-term
effect of the real estate tax incentives is to encourage inefficient resource
allocation, and not to increase significantly investments in depreciable
realty.8 2
79 See Surrey, supra note 64, at 719-26.
80 See notes 109-10 and accompanying text infra.
s1 p. STERN, supra note 63, at 179.
82 Taubman & Rasche, The Income Tax and Real Estate Investment 138, presented
at the Symposium on Tax Incentives of the Tax Institute of America (1969).
Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means has revealed how
ineffective the tax incentives for low- and middle-income housing have been:
For the past two years, total housing starts have dramatically ex-
ceeded this nation's housing goals. In fact, the number of new units
built between 1950 and the end of 1970 totalled about 31 million. Dur-
ing the same period the total number of households grew by about 21
million. In other words, over a 20-year period about one and a half new
housing units were constructed for each additional family. But, if you
examine completion data for conventional apartments with rents of
'$125 per month and below,' they rather consistently amount to ex-
tremely low percentages of the total. For example, in calendar year
1968, about 400,000 apartments were completed. But only 8% of that
total had rents below $125; 71% were $150 or more. In 1971, the de-
cline in percent of units completed below $125 was rather precipitous-
only 3% of more than 330,000 finished apartments. In the third quar-
ter of 1972, about 140,000 units were completed-82% had rents
structured at $150 or above-36% of this total at $200 or more. There
is a very energetic effort to build apartments on a conventional basis
in this nation-but very little of it is directed toward low- and mod-
erate-income families in desperate need of shelter.
Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 3167 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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Tax incentives, as opposed to direct subsidies, are not reviewed by
Congress every fiscal year. Tax incentives continue to exist even if Con-
gress fails to act, whereas direct expenditures cease if Congress does not
appropriate funds.
Tax incentives may provide startling tax "write-offs" for the wealthy,
thereby spreading dissatisfaction among taxpaying low- and middle-in-
come families. It has been said that the "widely-observed spectacle" of
upper income taxpayers investing in tax shelters as an alternative to pay-
ing the prescribed taxes on their incomes has a demoralizing impact on
those taxpayers with considerably less income."" Any activity that can lead
to an erosion of compliance levels must be viewed with the utmost con-
cern.
84
The use of tax incentives exacerbates the inequities in the amount of
return, on the same investment, received by taxpayers in varying tax
brackets. Although deduction-funded subsidies are usually worth more to
high bracket investors, the subsidy constitutes only a moderate portion of
the overall rate of return;8 5 thus, differences between the rates of return
are not large in an absolute sense. However, a high bracket taxpayer who
has invested in depreciable realty uses the principles of leverage to mag-
nify the rewards of his larger subsidy. The incentive, therefore, can be-
come the primary source of return, with the result that high bracket inves-
tors often receive twice the rate of return received by equivalent inves-
tors who fall in lower tax brackets.8 6 In addition, high mortgage interest
rates may discourage lower bracket taxpayers from investing, whereas the
rate of return available to high bracket investors may alone be sufficient
to induce an investment in realty.8 7
Tax incentives encourage the investor in a tax shelter program to be
concerned solely with the tax losses generated by the program, and not
with the business or economic worth or flaws of a particular investment.
It has been noted that the tax shelter industry entails an
unfortunate and growing waste of scarce capital resources....
While there is a crying need for more capital and increased pro-
duction in... housing, the diversion of economic resources into
the pursuit of deductions frequently results in investments of
an uneconomic nature. To be blunt, a lot of tax shelter money
goes into unworthwhile economic deals which offer the most
glittering promises of deductions. Meanwhile, there is no such
abundance of capital in the country that we can afford to see
billions of dollars used with less than optimum productivity. 8
83 Remarks, supra note 76, at 7.
84 Id. at 7-8.
85 The rate of return for a real estate investment is derived by dividing the sum of
the net annual income of the investment before tax and the finance charges, by the
purchase price.
86 McKee, supra note 63, at 573 (app. figure 5).
87 Id. at 558 n.92.
88 Remarks, supra note 76, at 8-9.
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The economic waste stemming from real estate tax shelter investments
is tremendous. For example, if a builder is to produce low- and moderate-
income rental housing pursuant to statutory mandate,81' his profit must
usually be obtained through a syndicate of wealthy investors. The primary
goal of the investors is to shelter their outside income and not necessarily
to create better and more low- and middle-income housing. The developer
receives his profits by selling "tax losses" to others, and only the wealthy
investors are interested in purchasing "losses." Thus. "in this sense. the
syndication vehicle and investor limited partners are totally superfluous.
parasitic participants in the development process."""
Using the tax system as a method of attracting investors forces the de-
veloper to absorb substantial expenses related to the sale of interests in
the real estate tax shelter. These expenses can amount to thousands of
dollars if the developer is to realize a profit from sale of the investment
property. These costs have no direct relationship to the cost of construct-
ing the housing."1 The tax shelter vehicle also encourages the developer
to build expensively. This incentive exists because the amount of profit
a developer can generate for investors is primarily a function of the con-
version of tax benefits to cash through syndication. Since the size of the
depreciation deduction that can be taken on a project is a key factor to
investors, it follows that it is to the developer's advantage to build the
most expensive structures possible, while still being able to rent all units
in the project. In addition, as a result of the step-up in an investor's basis
that results from nonrecourse loans,"2 developers have every incentive to
seek a commitment for the largest possible mortgage. The developer has
relatively little incentive to achieve construction economies. To do so
would simply reduce the tax benefits that the developer must show in
order to obtain the maximum profit from the syndicators who sell the
partnership interests.""
89 See note 11 supra.
90 Hearings, supra note 82. at 3166.
I As an example, a typical public offering of $15 million of partnership securities
can generate $245,000 of expenses completely unrelated to the partnership's real
estate investments. These expenses include fees for registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the various state securities commissioners; the NASD
filing fee; accounting, legal, printing and organizational fees; and miscellaneous ex-
penses. See the registration statement of MultiVest Real Estate Fund, Ltd., Series VI,
pt. II, item 27 (Oct. 16, 1973) (File No. 2-4858, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Washington, D.C.).
92 See notes 51-60 and accompanying text supra.
93 A recent Wall Street Journal article highlights the situation in which investors
often find themselves once they have purchased their interests in real estate tax
shelter syndications:
At first, all goes well. You get your initial tax shelter, the place then
fills up, and you start getting a tax-free check every month. Then the
checks stop. The promoter's phone is disconnected. You find out that
your syndicate is broke. The promoter has gone off into the sunset
carrying a sizeable hunk of the partners' investments in the form of fees
and commissions; the swingles have moved to the beach, and Whoopee
Towers is half-empty and losing money. Then the Internal Revenue
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The inevitable consequence of using our tax system in this man-
ner is clear; there are enormous indirect losses to the federal
government, wholly extraneous parties are introduced to the
housing process and hundreds of millions of dollars are diverted
away from building. It's all virtually required by our present
tax laws.
9 4
Service tells you that because of the syndicate's demise, you owe a
bundle to Uncle Sam. You think about moving to the Bahamas.
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1973, at 1. The article notes that nobody knows how
many real estate syndicates have gone bankrupt, but that the number is considerable,
and if the critics are right, a lot more will be folding before long. "Many syndicates
face trouble . . . . The promoters' fees and expenses are exorbitant, the properties
they buy or put up are run down, or the syndicator doesn't manage the property
properly. Also, many parts of the country are already overbuilt." Id.
The California Department of Corporations has released a study dealing with the
increasing numbers of failures of real estate tax shelter syndications. The study was
prompted by the receipt of numerous complaints by investors, and it was determined
that the principal reasons for the failures were:
1. Front-end compensation and other promotional interests received by
the syndicator and his or its affiliates.
2. Excessive purchase price paid for the property.
3. Insufficient down payment with large balloon payments.
4. Absent or poor management of the properties involved.
5. Failure by the limited partners to contribute additional assessments.
6. Lack of experience or expertise of the syndicator to select suitable
properties and to arrange sound financial structuring.
7. Certain economic factors.
CALIF. DEP'T OF CORP., SYNDICATION FAILURES, A SURVEY OF SOME BASIC REASONS
BEHIND THE FAILURE OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS 2 (1973), on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
In an attempt to check the proliferation of real estate syndications that are fraudu-
lently misrepresenting the economic and tax advantages of their programs, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) has filed complaints against more than a half-
dozen promoters within the past two years. In SEC v. United Professional Planning,
Inc., Civil No. 73-141 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 24, 1973), the SEC alleged that the pro-
moters (who had gone into bankruptcy stranding 2500 investors who had put $19
million into various projects) of two real estate limited partnerships had fraudulently
induced the purchase of limited partnership interests, by failing to disclose to in-
vestors that the programs' property investments were purchased from conduits for
the promoter and its affiliates; that the property investments were made at highly
inflated prices, bearing no relation to their fair market values; that the promoters
falsely represented that substantial tax deductions could be claimed by investors
when in fact such deductions were very likely to be disallowed on audit; and that
the claimed tax shelter aspects of the program were generated by the materially
increased price, cost, and risk that investors were made to bear. The suit was subse-
quently settled by a consent decree, whereby the promoters agreed not to do the acts
complained of, although they did not admit that they had violated the law. See
also SEC v. A. J. Groesbeck Financial Advisors, Inc., Civil No. 73-2678 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Nov. 15, 1973).
94 Hearings, supra note 82, at 3166-67.
The following example illustrates the excessive cost to the government that results
from a syndication of a $2 million apartment project:
In a typical 236 rehabilitation project, an investor would give a tax
shelter broker $500,000 to invest. The broker keeps $100,000 as his fee
and gives $400,000 to the developer. The developer spends $60,000 on
the actual housing project and keeps $340,000 as his fee. In return for
his $500,000 investment, the high tax bracket investor has (up to)
$200,000 a year taken off his tax (liability) for five years---due to rapid
depreciation permitted by the law-and after about 20 years he will sell
284 [VOL. 7:267
Real Estate Tax Shelters
Regarding the quest by taxpayers for "losses," it has been observed that
[] n this remarkable field, the greater the losses, the more sal-
able the investment. The choicest deal of all is the one where
you get to lose more than your total investment.... The syn-
dicated shelter promises the hope of economic gains, but ad-
vertises the certainty of immediate writeoffs, and all the magic
is in the latter. The consequence of this is an unseemly scram-
ble to promise more losses than promised by the next competing
shelter, all of which... leads to the sale of deductions which
really aren't there-which won't withstand audit. 11
Tax incentives create windfalls by rewarding taxpayers for doing what
they might ordinarily do anyway i.e., invest in a particular activity. They
distort the choices of the marketplace and produce inefficiency in the al-
location of resources. Tax incentives also keep tax rates high by constrict-
ing the tax base and thereby reducing revenue. This effect partially re-
sults from the open-ended character of the revenue loss from the use of
tax incentives: it is difficult to foretell how much will be indirectly spent
by the government through a particular incentive. Revenue losses from
tax shelters in 1973, for example, are estimated to be well in excess of
one billion dollars.";
Thus, although the real estate tax shelter was primarily the result of a
legislative error, 17 its proponents attempt to justify its continued existence
by claiming that it is an incentive for investment in depreciable realty. 'S
It can readily be seen that manipulation of the tax system may not be an
appropriate tool for stimulating investment in socially favored sectors of
the project and have the proceeds taxed at the low capital gains rate.
In the meantime, the project gets built with a $2 million loan guaran-
teed by the Federal Housing Administration.
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. OF CONGRESS, THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PRO-
GRAMS (1972), reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1972, at 19. For a discussion of
the views of the housing industry on government housing subsidies see Downs, Fed-
eral Housing Subsidies: Their Nature and Eflectiveness and What We Should Do
About Them, REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP. (Oct., 1972).
95 Remarks, supra note 76, at 5-6.
Mr. Donald Alexander, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, has indi-
cated that before ruling in advance that an organization will qualify as a limited
partnership, the IRS may require that 1) aggregate tax deductions for the partner-
ship's first two years not exceed the amount of equity invested in the partnership; 2)
the general partner have at least a 1 percent interest in each material item of income,
gain, loss, deduction, and credit of the partnership; and 3) the shelter group provide
more information than is currently required, in order to ensure that loans are truly
loans. Remarks by Commissioner Alexander, before the Cleveland Tax Institute, in
Cleveland, Ohio Nov. 15, 1973, reported in Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1973, at 1.
For an interesting example of what can go wrong with a tax shelter investment, see
Long Way From Haven, The Sad Saga of Mountain Village, A Tax Shelter with
Leaks, Barron's, Nov. 19, 1973, at 11.
96 Remarks, supra note 76, at 5. In addition, the Treasury estimates that the sub-
sidy to nonowner-occupied buildings for just the accelerated portion of real estate
depreciation deductions was $750 million in fiscal 1968. See Surrey, supra note 64, at
709-10.
97 See text accompanying note 64 supra.
98 But see text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
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the economy. 99 Particularly with respect to real estate investment, the de-
fects of the tax incentive method are readily apparent. Sound economic,
social, and tax policy considerations require that reform measures be im-
plemented to abate the growth of the tax shelter investment industry.
III. REFORM OF TAX SHELTER INVESTMENTS
There have been several attempts, over the years, to enact measures
designed to deal with the problems which arose after enactment of Section
167(b) of the Code in 1954. The 1954 changes in the Code, which per-
mitted depreciation on new investments in capital equipment and struc-
tures to be computed by accelerated methods (either the double declining
balance method'1° or the sum-of-the-years'-digits method'0 1), thereby al-
lowed recovery of a greater portion of costs in the earlier years of an in-
vestment's life. These favorable depreciation determination methods, in
combination with extremely high marginal tax rates10 2 and favorable tax
treatment of long-term capital gains, 10 3 originally encouraged the devel-
opment of the real estate tax shelter.
A. The Tax Reforms of 1962 and 1964
After the 1954 changes, Congress gradually came to realize that the
liberalized depreciation methods were the direct cause of tax abuse involv-
ing investments in real and personal property. Congress then began to
consider various reform measures that would correct the error it previ-
ously had made.
In 1962, Congress instituted a recapture rule, but only with respect to
depreciable personal property. Under this rule, the gain on the sale of
personal property is treated as ordinary income to the extent of all depre-
ciation deductions attributable to periods after December 31, 1961.104
Congress rejected the Department of the Treasury's suggestion that the
same rule apply to depreciable real property.
10 5
99 See Surrey, supra note 64, at 734-38.
100 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(b)(2). Under this method, the taxpayer is able
to compute the depreciation deduction on the basis of twice the straight-line rate ap-
plied to the adjusted basis. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(g).
101 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(b)(3). Using this method, the rate of deprecia-
tion for any year is a fraction the numerator of which is the remaining useful life at
the beginning of the year and the denominator of which is the sum of the digits
representing years of useful life.
102 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1.
10 3 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1201, 1202.
104 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1245.
105 President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1961). The Treasury had recommended that the
amount of depreciation subject to recapture with respect to real property be phased
out at the rate of 1 percent per month for each month that the property was held in
excess of seventy-two months. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1962 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1962).
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In 1964, however, Congress enacted a recapture rule for real property.'
Under the 1964 reforms, the gain on the sale or exchange of depreciable
real property, where such disposition takes place within ten years after
acquisition, is considered ordinary income to the extent of a declining per-
centage of the excess of the post-1963 depreciation over straight-line de-
preciation. The recapture percentage is phased out at the rate of one per-
centage point for each full month the property is held over twenty
months. Therefore, if the real property is held for over ten years, none
of the excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation is recaptured as
ordinary income.10 7
The 1964 recapture rule was the first serious congressional attempt
since the 1954 enactment to limit real estate tax abuse. The congressional
remedy was not to be accomplished by denying the accelerated deprecia-
tion deduction that had given rise to the abuse, but by limiting the possi-
ble conversion of ordinary income into capital gain upon the disposition of
the property.' 08
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1969
To deal with the nation's housing problem, Congress enacted the Hous-
ing and Urban Development Act of 1968,109 which declared its goal, as a
matter of national policy, to be the provision of federal assistance for the
construction and rehabilitation of twenty-six million housing units by 1976,
of which six million were to be subsidized for low- and middle-income fam-
ilies. 110 The 1968 housing legislation was partially in response to the
prevailing high interest rates and decreasing money supply, both of which
made it difficult to meet the nation's housing needs through normal mar-
ket means."'
After this enactment, both Congress and the Administration recognized
the need for reconciling the objectives of tax reform with the stated goal
of providing housing. The Tax Reform Act of 1969112 attempted to
strengthen the provisions on real property recapture that had been im-
posed by the 1964 reforms, and, at the same time, to encourage construc-
tion of certain types of housing.
Seeking to curb the tax shelter that had been available to all real estate
investments, Congress made a number of changes which reduced the tax
106 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1250.
107 See U.S. Dep't of Treasury Tax Reform Studies and Proposals Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means and Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 447 (1969).
108 See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
109 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1968).
11042 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1968). See also S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1968). The legislation was in response to a report by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development which concluded that some twenty million Americans were living
in substandard housing.
111 The credit squeeze made it difficult to obtain financing to purchase or construct
housing. Even where financing was available, high interest rates deterred people from
borrowing.
112 Act of Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 651 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REV.
CODE of 1954).
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benefits available to investments in nonresidential real estate. The 1969
reforms eliminated two forms of accelerated depreciation: the double de-
clining balance and the sum-of-the-years'-digits methods. The maximum
depreciation rate now available for new property is 150 percent of the de-
clining balance;'1: used property can be depreciated only on the straight-
line method. 1 14 The 1969 reforms also provided for unlimited recapture
of the excess depreciation over straight-line depreciation taken after
1969,115 thereby significantly reducing the possibility that the taxpayer
could obtain capital gains treatment on the eventual sale of the pro-
perty.116
At the same time being conscious of the nation's increased need for
housing, Congress preserved, and in some ways increased, the tax advan-
tages available to investments in residential real estate. Under the 969
reform provisions. new residential housing 117 can be depreciated under
either a 200 percent of the declining balance method or the sum-of-the-
years'-digits method."1 ' Used residential housing can be depreciated at
125 percent of the declining balance, provided that the property has a
remaining life of at least twenty years. 1 9 In addition, other provisions
were enacted to encourage rehabilitation of existing low-income rental
housing. 120
The 1969 modifications also revised the depreciation recapture rules
with respect to residential property. Under the revised rules, a 200-month
holding period is required in order to eliminate recapture. 121 If
residential real property is sold during the first hundred months, the en-
tire amount of depreciation claimed in excess of straight-line depreciation
is recaptured as ordinary income, but the recaptured amount cannot ex-
ceed the gain recognized. If the property is sold during the second hun-
dred months, the amount of recapture is reduced by a percentage equal
to one percentage point a month for each month after the first hundred
months.' 22 Special rules are provided where governmentally subsidized
housing projects are involved. 123
113 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(j)(I)(B).
114 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(j)(4).
115 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 1250(a)(1).
116 The new rule applies to properties purchased both before and after the effective
date of the Reform Act. Id.
117 In order to qualify as "residential housing," at least 80 percent of the gross
income from the property must be rental income from dwelling units. TNT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 167(j)(2)(B). It should be noted that the test is applied on a yearly basis,
and therefore a property might meet the test in some years and not in others.
118 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1670)(2).
119 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1670)(5).
120 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(k).
121 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(C)(iii).
122 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(C).
123 For example, an FHA 236 [12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z, 1715z-1 (1968)] housing project
is still subject to the old ten-year recapture rule instead of the extended 200-month
(sixteen years, eight months) rule. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii).
In addition, a roll-over feature for federally assisted projects permits investors to
defer tax on the gain resulting from a sale of the property to tenants or to an ap-
proved tenant organization, provided that the proceeds are reinvested within a pre-
scribed period. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1039.
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In an attempt to discourage investments in tax shelters, the 1969 re-
forms also introduced the concept of the minimum tax. 12 4 This tax is
based on the principle that individuals or corporations should not be able
to combine tax preferences to escape totally their liability for federal in-
come taxes. A minimum tax is placed on tax preference items such as the
excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line' 2 5 and the excess of
investment interest over investment income in net lease situations.' 2 6
C. Current Tax Reform Proposals
Although the tax reforms of 1969 made some progress toward limiting
the tax abuses of real estate tax shelters, the overall effect of these re-
forms has been negligible.12- The recapture rules and new depreciation
rates have had no real effect on limiting the growth of real estate tax
shelters1'28 or encouraging the development of low- and middle-income
housing. -' :2 John H. Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy, has stated that "as long as the basic tax principles of partner-
ship flow-through, cash method accounting, leverage, and such basic de-
ductions as accelerated depreciation are retained, I am not optimistic that
any fundamental relief will be achieved by administrative means."'13 0
Because of the pervasive abuses that exist today, a number of tax re-
form proposals have been advanced to deal with tax shelters in general
and real estate tax shelters in particular.
1. Treasury Proposals-Certain tax reform proposals. which were sub-
mitted to the House Ways and Means Committee by former Treasury Secre-
tary George P. Schultz, would have a signifcant impact on tax shelter pro-
grams." It is the Administration's feeling that enactment of the pro-
posed legislation is the only realistic solution to the tax shelter problem. 13 2
124 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 56-58.
125 Id. § 57(a)(2).
126 Id. §§ 57(a)(1), (b).
127 See McKee, supra note 63, at 552-53.
128 See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
129 See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
130See Remarks, supra note 76, at 10. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
been attempting to employ administrative measures as a stopgap solution, until ef-
fective legislation is adopted. For instance, the Los Angeles office of the IRS has
moved aggressively against a number of popular shelter techniques. "The effort is
seen by some as the leading edge of a growing IRS effort nationwide to stunt the
explosive growth of shelters." Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1973, at 1, col. 5. It is
reported that the IRS has been challenging selected taxpayers and then letting word
of the action spread through the "tax lawyer grapevine." id. See also New Crackdown
on "Tax Shelters," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 24, 1973, at 47, 49.
131 PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE, supra note 2, at 95.
132 Remarks, supra note 76, at 1I. Former Secretary Schultz has stated that the
aim of the proposals
is to improve the image of fairness in the tax system by reducing to
zero if possible "horror stories" about the wealthy whose tax returns
show little or no tax .... We must deal effectively with aspects of the
system that may undermine confidence in it and, therefore, cooperation
with it.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1973, (Sunday Business Section) at 1.
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The proposal that is specifically designed to control tax shelter abuses
is entitled Limitation on Artificial Accounting Losses (LAL). This provi-
sion is aimed at artificial losses that are created for an otherwise profitable
business through tax accounting rules, and which are then used to shelter
income from other unrelated sources.
The intended effect of LAL is to require that new investments
of outside money in tax-preferred industries be made with hard
dollars. In other words, first you pay the tax on your regular in-
come ... then you may invest in any attractive opportunity you
find. If you then have an economic loss-as distinguished from
a mere tax loss-you can claim it for tax purposes against your
other income .... The basic reasons for the LAL approach are
not complicated .... While it still permits an investor to shelter
all or part of the income from his investment in . . . housing,
the investment itself will have to be in hard dollars-the in-
vestor's outside income will no longer be sheltered. [The Trea-
sury] believe [sI that when all of the money invested is that of
the investor himself and not the Government, more care will
be used in selecting economically desirable investments. And at
the same time, the long-time bona fide operator in the industry
will have less unfair competition from those who are really
more interested in deductions . .. 133
The Administration believes that its LAL proposals will retain all the
tax incentives presently available to real estate; however, certain tax in-
centives will be limited to the activity for which they were created, and
their effects will not be permitted to spill over to offset income from unre-
lated activities. The LAL rules, in essence, would force an individual tax-
payer (corporations are excluded from LAL) to treat his tax shelter activ-
ity apart from his other activities, thereby stripping away the artificial
loss. In the event that a loss still results, even after the artificial loss has
been excluded, it would then be recognized as a true loss, which could
be used to offset other unrelated income. The artificial accounting loss
would still be able to offset, i.e., shelter, income from the investment.
Any artificial loss remaining after the permissible offsets would be placed
in a deferred loss account, which would be available in the future to off-
set only income that arose from the tax shelter activity. 34 Thus, the
LAL provision would apply to that portion of any loss, attributable to the
real estate, which would disappear if the taxpayer had no accelerated de-
133 Remarks, supra note 76, at 11-12.
134 In any subsequent year the amount in the account would be increased by any
related LAL loss. In a year in which the net related income exceeded the accelerated
deductions for that year, the excess would be deducted from the account and allowed
as a deduction. If the property that generated the LAL loss is sold or disposed of,
the portion of the deferred loss account attributed to the property would be deducted
from the account and added to the property's adjusted basis. This rule would not
apply when the proceeds of the sale constitute related income-as in the case of the
sale of housing held primarily for sale.
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ductions for the taxable year.1 3z5
With respect to real property, the LAL rules would cover accelerated
deductions taken in connection with investments in improved real estate
that is held either for rental or primarily for sale in the ordinary course of
business. These deductions include: 1) accelerated depreciation; 2) the
special sixty-month depreciation allowance for rehabilitated housing;1313
and 3) pre-opening construction costs, in connection with the constructed
property or the associated land, which are paid or incurred during the pe-
riod of construction or are attributable to that period. 13 7
In the case of residential rental property s and housing held primarily
for sale, the class of related income that can be offset by accelerated de-
ductions would include rental income from all residential real estate, as
well as sales income from housing held primarily for sale.1" ' However,
the class of related income for nonresidential real estate would include
only the rental income, or sales income if the property is held primarily
for sale, from the particular property to which the accelerated deductions
are attributable. Thus each nonresidential building will be treated as a
separate property, unless one or more buildings on a single tract or on
contiguous tracts are managed and operated as a unit, in which case all
such buildings will be treated as a single property. Finally, the LAL
proposals would retain the traditional property basis adjustments for non-
residential property. 140
135 The following is an example of how the artificial loss would be determined. A
taxpayer has earnings of $25,000 in 1974. He invests in a new rental apartment build-
ing and for the taxable year 1974 his share of the income and expenses from the






(in excess of straight-line) 15,000 82,000
Loss ($ 7,000)
Under the present law the taxpayer has a tax "loss" of $7,000 which would be eligible
to offset the taxpayer's earnings. Under the proposed LAL rules, the net related in-
come from the property is $8,000 ($75,000 gross rents, minus interest, operating costs,
and straight-line depreciation). Thus, the additional accelerated depreciation of $15,-
000 is able to offset only the net related income of $8,000. The excess $7,000 of
accelerated depreciation is an artificial accounting loss, and would therefore be added
to the Deferred Loss Account, to be deducted against the taxpayer's future net related
income from residential real estate.
136 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(k).
137 These costs include interest, state, local, and foreign taxes, and incidental costs
such as management, brokerage and legal fees, insurance, transfer and recording fees.
PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE, supra note 2, at 99.
138 Defined in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(j)(2)(B).
139 The Administration believes "that this broader definition of related income
gives effect to the more liberal legislative policy reflected in section 167() which pro-
vides the incentive of full accelerated depreciation for residential real estate." PRO-
POSALS FOR TAX CHANGE, supra note 2, at 99.
140 The Administration feels that Congress did not apply a liberal legislative policy
with respect to nonresidential property; therefore, the LAL proposal reflects a more
conservative approach in its treatment of this type of property. Id. A taxpayer, who
uses accelerated depreciation and has placed all or a portion of the deduction into his
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The drafters of the LAL proposal claim that it is designed to have no
effect on those taxpayers who are regularly and profitably engaged in the
real estate business activity. But the proposal as it now stands would have
a direct impact on only the developers of nonresidential real estate; in-
vestors in residential real estate tax shelters would be able to continue to
"roll over" such investments with little or no tax cost, because of the
method used in computing related income. 1 41 Nevertheless, the Treasury
estimates that the LAL proposal will slow the activity of the syndicate
merchandisers considerably and will bring in an' extra $500 million per
year in revenues.1 42
The Administration believes that the matching of income with the ex-
pense of earning it is "[f] undamental to our federal income tax system"
and that LAL will help achieve that objective.1 4 : While one commentator
has stated that "[t]he LAL proposal can... be questioned on two con-
ceptual grounds: that it overemphasizes the importance of 'matching' as
opposed to other tax accounting principles, and that the use of a suspense
account fails to achieve matching, ' 144 the Wall Street Journal, in a recent
editorial in support of the LAL proposal, stated that LAL
would stop ever-increasing amounts of capital from flowing into
ever-increasing numbers of unjustifiable speculations. Making
investors play with their own money would be a clear incentive
for the more efficient use of capital. 1 45
2. Other Reform Proposals-In addition to the Treasury's LAL pro-
posal, there are several other reform proposals that deserve consideration
if truly effective reforms are to be adopted. While some of these proposals
would eliminate tax shelters completely, others represent stopgap mea-
sures and, as such, would merely treat the symptoms rather than the
cause of the problem. A brief sketch of these proposals may be helpful.
a. Elimination of Tax Shelters-One proposal would eliminate the tax
shelter completely by dropping all tax incentives and adopting a system of
direct governmental expenditures in their place. This solution has been
suggested by Professor Surrey, who feels that there are distinct economic
and social advantages to the direct expenditure approach. 46 These ad-
deferred loss account, would be able to use the full amount of the depreciation, com-
puted under the method adopted by the taxpayer, for the purpose of basis adjustment.
For example, even though a taxpayer used accelerated depreciation and had to place
all or a portion of the deduction into the deferred loss account, the full amount of
depreciation computed under the method of depreciation adopted by the taxpayer
would be treated as allowed for purposes of basis adjustment. See INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 1016.
141 A tax shelter investor will be able to avoid tax on the profit from the sale of
residential property by offsetting that profit with losses on other residential property
that have been accumulated in a deferred loss account.
142 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 6, 1973, at 22, col. 2.
143 PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE, supra note 2, at 95.
144 Feinschreiber, 1973 Tax Reform: The Administration's Proposals, 51 TAXES
398, 400 (1973).
145 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 6, 1973, at 20, col. 2.
146 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 1, at 23.
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vantages are reflected in the salient differences between direct expendi-
tures and tax incentives. First, in the case of a direct expenditure, there
is public knowledge of the expenditure through circulation of the federal
budget. Second, since most direct government assistance for business ac-
tivities is given on a before-tax basis, the expenditure is entered as a plus
in the accounts of the person benefited. Tax incentives do not work this
way, because the financial assistance afforded by the tax incentive-which
has the purpose of making after-tax profits high enough to induce the de-
sired action by the taxpayer-is not included in income, but instead re-
duces taxable income. 147 Thus while a direct expenditure works on a
before-tax basis, the tax incentive operates on an after-tax basis.
One commentator, remarking on economic considerations, has noted:
Every tax incentive ... means the open charting of a new tax
escape path, a path whose instructions read that the wealthier
the person who takes it, the larger are the rewards. Direct pro-
grams of Government assistance are not built that way and have
no such instructions .... Today's loopholes are not the prod-
uct of tax brains fiendishly seeking hidden escape tunnels. The
escape tunnels are sketched in the law for all to see. They are
the product of misdirected attempts to use tax subsidies and
incentives to reach goals that could, if to be sought at all, be
achieved far more efficiently and fairly by direct government
programs.148
b. Limitation on Tax Deductions-This proposal would eliminate the
real estate tax shelter by limiting allowable tax deductions to the amount
of economic depreciation. Structures would be classified according to their
precise economic depreciation rates. 14'. In this way the depreciation de-
duction would more accurately represent the decline in the actual value
147 It has been said that
the tax incentive . . . produces both financial assistance and freedom
from taxation. That freedom means much more to the well-off indi-
vidual than to one in the lower brackets.
Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. I, at 20.
148 Surrey, supra note 64, at 21. Professor Surrey suggests that the use of tax in-
centives is destructive of the fairness of the tax system:
The irony of all this is illustrated by the Treasury Department's first
proposing a housing rehabilitation tax incentive in 1969 and then having
to suggest that the incentive is a 'tax preference' which must be guarded
against by including it in the new minimum tax designed ... to prevent
the wealthy from escaping all tax burdens. The use of the direct ex-
penditure route for this assistance to housing would have prevented this
particular tax escape.
Id.
Professor Surrey also believes that tax incentives divide the consideration and ad-
ministration of government programs, and confuse and complicate that consideration
by Congress, in the Administration and in the budget process. Additionally, he is
convinced that tax incentives do not improve the tax system and are likely to damage
it significantly. Surrey, supra note 64, at 728-32.
149 Taubman and Rasche indicate that
[flor both office and apartment buildings we find that the tax de-
preciation rules-even after the 1969 revision-confer substantial sub-
sidies. For example, the true depreciation of office buildings in the first
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of the property, rather than an artificially inflated rate of depreciation.
One drawback to this plan, however, is that it would be difficult to deter-
mine the proper classification of structures and their corresponding depre-
ciation rates. 150
c. Full Depreciation Recapture-A third proposal would provide for
full depreciation recapture instead of the present recapture of only the ex-
cess of depreciation deductions over straight-line depreciation. 15 1 Under
this approach, the difference between the amount received on the disposi-
tion of the partnership property investment and the depreciable basis of
that property at the time of the disposition would be taxed as ordinary
income. This proposal recognizes that even straight-line depreciation is
excessive in almost all cases. Whether the depreciation is excessive in a
particular case can be demonstrated if the depreciable property is sold for
more than its depreciated basis. Since a significant portion of property
investments held by real estate syndicates are eventually sold for more
than their depreciated basis, a fortiori these property investments declined
in value by less than the amount used in calculating the annual depre-
ciation deduction. 152
There are two arguments in favor of complete recapture. First, it can
be argued that, on the sale of property, there is no sound reason to per-
mit any part of a gain attributable to depreciation deductions to be taxed
other than as ordinary income. Second, there is no justification for per-
mitting the income generated by the property investment to be sheltered
by excess depreciation deductions, thereby allowing ordinary income to
be taxed at capital gain rates.' 5 3
d. Tax Deferrals as Loans-Another suggestion would limit the advan-
tages of tax deferral, by treating deferrals as loans and requiring repay-
year is less than one-tenth of that allowed under straight line depreci-
ation. Indeed, true depreciation for office buildings falls short of that
allowed by the straight-line method for each of the first 45 years of the
office building's useful life. We calculate that on a before tax basis, the
straight line depreciation allowed by the law yields a subsidy of 18 per-
cent of the purchase price while double declining balance adds ap-
proximately 10 percent more. The results are similar for apartment
buildings. In the first year, true depreciation is less than one-fourth of
that allowed under the straight line method and true depreciation does
not exceed the tax allowance until after the passage of 40 years. The
straight line tax depreciation method confers a subsidy of 14 percent
while accelerated methods can double this. In both industries a reverse
sum of the years digits method would approximate true depreciation.
Taubman & Rasche, supra note 82, at 342-43.
These remarks demonstrate the inaccuracy of current depreciation methods and
the reasons for the authors' feelings that economic depreciation would be preferable.
150 McKee, supra note 63, at 564-65.
151 This is presently the case with nonresidential property that is held for less than
one year. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text supra.
152 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 4, at 571.
153 Therefore, the recapture rule should be the same as the rule for personal
property under Section 1245 of the Code. Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 4, at
571.
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ment of these loans with interest.'" Even full recapture, as described in
the previous proposal, would not eliminate the economic advantage that
real estate tax shelters derive from the excessive depreciation deductions
taken on property investments. This is because investors in these tax shel-
ters are able to obtain the use of the income that is sheltered by the de-
preciation deductions until the eventual disposition of the property invest-
ment; in effect, the use of sheltered income is a tax subsidy in the form of
an interest-free loan. 15''5 This proposal would at least prevent such loans
from escaping interest charges.
e. Limitations on Leverage-Real estate tax shelters could be made
less attractive by limiting the use of leverage. This could be accomplished
in two ways.
One po3sible method would be to prohibit a step-up in the investor's
tax basis of an investment, if the increase in basis would be attributable
to the limited partnership investor's pro rata share of the partnership's
nonrecourse loans. An investor thus would be allowed to take advantage
of the increased basis only to the extent of his personal liability on the
indebtedness. Since the amounts of nonrecourse loans would not be added
to the bases of the individual limited partners, each partner's share of the
partnership's deductions would be constrained by the amount of actual
equity plus the amount of personal liability of the partner on the partner-
ship's indebtedness. 17
A second, even more restrictive, approach would be to limit an inves-
tor's basis in the partnership investment solely to the partner's actual eq-
uity in that investment, regardless of any personal liability on the partner-
ship's indebtedness. It can be argued than an investor who is personally
liable on indebtedness which is secured by the partnership's property in-
vestments faces little if any actual economic risk, since in most cases the
value of the property alone would be sufficient to cover any outstanding
indebtedness on such property. It has been observed that "if a lender is
willing to make a loan secured primarily by the property, then a market
determination has been made that the value of the property will not be
less than the remaining balance of the mortgage at any given time."' 5 7
Therefore, if this proposal were adopted, the investor would be permitted
to step-up his tax basis in a partnership investment only to the extent of
his equity in the partnership. 1 8
f. Capitalization of Costs-Finally, capital costs could be capitalized
rather than expensed as is presently permitted. The allowance of deduc-
154This approach was adopted in 1965 by the Senate Finance Committee with re-
gard to deferral of taxes by beneficiaries of accumulation trusts. S. REP. No. 91-552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 129-30 (1969).
155 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
156 See note 60 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Tax Consequences
of the Disposition of Property Subject to an Unassumed Mortgage, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 845, 851 (1949). Recent proposals to so limit depreciation deductions include
H.R. 1040, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
157 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 4, at 571.
158 Panel Discussions, supra note 21, pt. 6, at 867.
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tions for capital costs during construction has a significant effect on the
rates of return and provides an attractive feature of real estate tax shel-
ters by enabling generation of huge first-year losses. 159 The true eco-
nomic need for allowing the expensing of capital costs during construction
should be determined. Imposing a requirement for capitalizing these costs
would be a means of controlling the abuse of incurring excessive losses for
tax purposes and would be consistent with generally accepted accounting
principles.' 60
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor William S. McKee has tersely concluded that "[t I he real estate
tax shelter is an inefficient and inequitable form of subsidy; it should be
eliminated.' 1' This proposal should not be considered as a radical solu-
tion to the problem of real estate tax shelters. Granting indirect subsidies
to the real estate industry through the tax system is not only efficient and
inequitable, but it also creates a distortion of resource-allocation priorities
and the tax system itself. If governmental financial assistance is required
in order to stimulate certain types of real estate development, direct gov-
ernmental expenditures would be preferable to the present indirect tax
incentive method.
Above all, reform of tax shelters is essential in order to demonstrate
to the American people that our tax laws can be fair. 162 Two authors
have aptly warned that "tax shelters will be the Achilles heel of the fed-
eral income tax if the Administration and the Congress do not move
promptly to bring them under control."'16 Fortunately, help may be on
the way. There are preliminary indications that Congress is prepared to
pass legislation in the near future that would place substantial restrictions
on tax shelters.6 4 Although this legislation may not completely eliminate
tax shelters, one can begin to hear high bracket taxpayers yelling "Gimme
Shelter!"
159 See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
160 Hearings, supra note 82, at 3165.
161 McKee, supra note 63, at 567.
162 Adam Smith states the argument in this way:
What we need, quite desperately at this point is a tax law that people
believe is fair. The tax law is too complex to inspire the belief that it is
fair . . . . People do not understand the laws; what they do know is
that nobody pays the top rates ....
NEWSWEEK, supra note 2, at 6.
163 Calkins & Updegraft, Jr., Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAWYER 493, 519 (1973). These
authors go on to say that
tax sheltering is the most misunderstood, and one of the most contro-
versial, practices now fostered by our federal tax system. If it does not
become more widely and accurately understood, thousands of investors
will learn to their sorrow that what is represented to them to be a tax
shelter may in fact be a tax trap. If some of the rules governing it are
not changed at once, tax sheltering will in five years lead to temptations
to tax evasion so strong that it will further erode self-assessment moral-
ity and produce a tax scandal of major proportions.
Id. at 493.
164 Remarks, supra note 76, at 16.
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